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FRANCOIS LAMY AND THE RHETORIC
OF ATTENTION OF MALEBRANCHE

FRANGOISLamy is always mentioned in the lively polemic over
rhetoric touched off in 1694 by the attack of Goibaud Dubois against
pulpit eloquence. The Benedictine Lamy became the center of the
controversy when a 1698 tclaircissement of his De la connaissance
de soi-m2me (5 vols. Paris, 1694-1698) provided the most thorough
critique of the ancient art the quarrel produced. Malebranche
himself did not participate directly in this dispute, but since he had
made similar criticisms in passing in the Recherche de la vtrite' (1674)
his presence was constantly felt in the background.
This resemblance is no coincidence. According to Fr. AndrC, an
eighteenth-century biographer of Malebranche, Lamy "passoit dans
la RCpubl. des lettres pour un imitateur servile du P.M." Just the
same, AndrC notes that Lamy was perfectly capable of taking independent positions. For example, when another 1698 tclaircissement
linked Malebranche to certain Quietist doctrines, the Oratorian felt
compelled to defend himself in print. Thus we can wonder to what
extent Lamy's criticisms of rhetoric reflect Malebranche's stance. A
1 For the mod recent discussion see Bernard Tocanne, L'Zde'e de nature en
France duns la seconde moiti6 du XVIIe si2cle (Paris, 1978), pp. 436-446.
Although Descartes admired the force and beauty of eloquence, there is
a deep current of mistrust for rhetoric in his thought. Fran~oisLamy here
gives us perhaps the most extensive and systematic attack against rhetoric
based on Cartesian principles. Some twenty years earlier the Oratorian Bernard
Lamy had tried to apply Cartesian notions in a more constructive way in
L'Art de parler (1675), where Pascal's more positive influence is also apparent.
3 Andr6, "Extrait de la vie du P. Malebranche" in Trait6 de ramour de
Dieu, (Euvres compl2tes de Malebranche, ed. Andr6 Robinet et al., 21 vols.
(Paris, 1962-1969), XIV, xxiii. All references to Malebranche are from this
edition and the Recherche, unless otherwise indicated.
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second eighteenth-century biographer, J. F. Adry, points out that
while Malebranche was named in the dispute over eloquence, he
refused to intervene: "ce qu'on pouvoit lui faire dire pour ou contre
la rhetorique le touchoit moins que la question subtile et delicate qui
avait brouillC les deux grands prelats de CAMBRAI et de MEAUX."
Lamy's position was that eloquence, by its very nature, cannot lead
to a knowledge of spiritual entities like God, angels or the soul
(V. 436-437) and that it corrupts man's heart and mind (V. 378).
Was Malebranche's silence due to agreement with Lamy or to his
well known desire to avoid polemics?
Although Lamy does not invoke Malebranche in his tclaircissement, he follows the general lines of the Oratorian's analysis. First,
Lamy takes aim at eloquence directed at the imagination and heart
rather than at the reason: "l'art d'aller i?i l'esprit par le cceur et d'aller
au cceur par l'imagination, l'art de persuader, sans raison" (V. 377).
Such a criticism echoes Malebranche's famous attacks against writers
like Seneca who persuaded by stirring up the imagination and
emotions, rather than by providing "l'evidence des raisons" (I. 345).
Second, this description of eloquence leads to an identification of
rhetoric with the stylistic devices that arouse the emotions and
imagination. Lamy speaks of "figures," "ornemens," and "mouvemens" (V. 377). Malebranche mentions the cadence of prose, figures
of speech (I. 180), and "couleurs sensibles" (11. 260), along with the
orator's delivery (I. 178). In so doing, both limit the province of
rhetoric to elocutio and pronuntiatio, leaving aside inventio and
dispositio, which had traditionally been concerned with the more
intellectual tasks of the discovery and arrangement of proofs.
Perhaps most important is that Lamy grounds his distrust of
rhetoric on Malebranche's interpretation of Cartesian psychophysiology. Lamy's preface asserts that his treatise is unique because of its
use of "principes naturels et physiques" (I. n. pag.), but when he
systematically explains how eloquence operates in terms of the relation
between soul and body, he only develops Malebranche's famous
remark that the tracings in the brain left by the passage of animal

4 J, F. Adry, "Pricis de la vie de Malebranche" in Malebranche vivant,
a u v r e s cornpl2tes de Malebranche, XX, 353.
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spirits are "le fondement de toutes les figures de la RhCtorique"
(I. 222).
Malebranche's misgivings about imaginative and emotional persuasion stem from his view of the union of the body and mind. The
imagination, which allows us to visualize absent material beings as if
they were present, must be distrusted as a form of sense perception.
When objects in the extended world are perceived, the flow of animal
spirits registers the data from the senses as tiny grooves in the brain.
Grooves that are imprinted at the same time are grouped together in
the brain, and when one is reactivated by the imagination, the others
associated with it are as well. This "liaison mutuelles des traces"
explains the evocative power of rhetorical figures (I. 222). Unfortunately, these "id6es sensibles," unlike what Malebranche calls "idCes
pures" or "intellectuelles," can only inform us about the relation of
material objects to ourselves; they cannot provide any true knowledge
of the objects themselves because we have been given sense perception
only for the conservation of our bodies (I. 186). Moreover,
Malebranche maintains that the senses have a greater attraction for
the mind because they penetrate it more completely than the "id6es
pures" which remain external to it (I. 177). When attracted by the
senses and imagination, the mind must struggle intensely to maintain
attention on the abstract, higher "idCes pures" (11. 251).
This danger is reinforced by the "communication contagieuse des
imaginations fortes" (I. 320), men whose minds are wholly dominated
by the mental pictures that result from the deep tracings left by sense
impressions (I. 323). Their use of vivid images and impassioned
delivery gives them exceptional persuasive ability (I. 329). The
passions are a no less dangerous cause of error. Like sense perceptions or the imagination, they are occasioned by a movement of
animal spirits, but affect the will rather than the understanding. They
not only push the will into hasty conclusions, but are more strongly
attracted by sensible objects than to spiritual truths (11. 175).
Malebranche was content to point out the role of the emotions
and imagination in persuasion as a warning of sorts not to be
deceived by them (111. 119). Lamy goes farther, affirming that such
rhetoric is "nuisible la perfection de l'esprit et du cceur" (V. 378).
To prove this, he takes up all the elements of Malebranche's
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analysis - the "traces profondes" in the brain (V. 390), the distinction between pure and sensible ideas (V. 392), the contagious
power of the imagination (V. 409), the sequence of steps by which
the emotions are excited (V. 432) to conclude that rhetoric corrupts
the mind by weakening its ability to maintain the judgment in
suspension. He insists that rhetoric should only be studied after the
judgment has been formed (V. 449). This negative conclusion is
perhaps implied in Malebranche's position, but the Oratorian does
not seem to have drawn it explicitly.
To be sure, Lamy's stance is not completely hostile. For example,
he is careful to distinguish between the "false" eloquence which
appeals to the heart and to the imagination and "true" eloquence
which only speaks to these faculties after having enlightened the mind
(V. 378). Lamy will even allow a speaker to address the imagination
in order to reach the understanding, as long as he refrains from
unduly stirring it up (111. 131). These concessions, however, can be
found for the most part in Malebranche, whose attitude is considerably more favorable.
One reason for this more positive view is epistemological. In the
Cartesian tradition, error is avoided and truth attained by a dual
effort of the will that suspends the judgment and keeps the attention
focused until clear and distinct ideas have been obtained. Lamy tends
to emphasize the deleterious effects of imaginative and emotional
rhetoric on the will's ability to suspend the judgment. On the other
hand, Malebranche stresses the active role of attention in the search
for truth. Attention is not just intense intellectual concentration; it
is the "pribre naturelle que nous faisons B la VCritt5 int6rieureY'(Conversations chre'tiennes, IV. 11) in whom we see all truth according to
Malebranche's doctrine of vision in God. In metaphysics attention is
the "combat de l'esprit contre les impressions du corps" (Entretiens
sur la me'taphysique, XII. 32). Although impressions from the body
like sense perceptions or the passions usually interfere with the
attention, the Recherche describes how under certain conditions the
imagination or an emotion like admiration can be used to focus and
maintain attention rather than destroying it (11. 205-206, 259). This
insight provides a theoretical basis for the use of the sensible in
eloquence; it justifies what Malebranche might have called a rhetoric
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of attention in which appeals to the imagination and emotions serve
to strengthen the mind's attention. He affirms that such traditional
rhetorical devices as figures of speech or impassioned delivery have
a necessary place, especially when dealing with questions of religion
or morality (111. 126).
Malebranche's concept of the Incarnation, which he considered
the central Christian mystery, furnishes a second basis for this
rhetoric of attention. He saw the Incarnation in rhetorical terms as
God's way of using the sensible to draw fallen man's attention to
higher truth: "... il faut exposer aux autres la vCritC, comme la
v6rit6 mCme s'est exposCe. Les hommes depuis le pCchC de leur pbre,
ayant la vile trop faible pour considerer la vCritC en elle-mCme, cette
souveraine vCritC s'est rendue sensible en se couvrant de nbtre
humanit6, afin d'attirer nos regards.. . Ainsi on peut B son exemple
couvrir de quelque chose de sensible les vCritez que nous voulons
comprendre & enseigner aux autres, afin d'arrCter I'esprit qui aime le
sensible, & qui ne se prend aisCment que par quelque chose qui flatte
les sens. La Sagesse Cternelle s'est rendue sensible, mais non dans
l'eclat.. . non pour nous arrCter au sensible, mais pour nous Clever B
l'intelligible" (11. 260-261).
The Incarnation thus becomes Malebranche's model for human
eloquence. First, it exemplifies the key rhetorical principle alluded to
in the Conversations chrttiennes (IV. 4) that the message must be
adapted to its audience. Second, it illustrates how sense impressions
can be properly used to direct the attention toward higher truth and
to make this truth attractive. Finally, the Incarnation indicates the
limits of the sensible, which must be used with prudence so as not
to dazzle or distract the mind from its true goal (11. 259-260).
Thus, Malebranche's failure to comment on Lamy's strictures
should not be taken as a sign of complete agreement. This would
not be the only occasion when Lamy's contentious disposition pushed
him to extreme positions. Although his critique develops in a systematic fashion scattered remarks on persuasion and rhetoric in
Malebranche, Lamy's emphasis on the judgment ignores the favorable
elements in the Oratorian's writings which point to the possibility of
a reformed rhetoric of attention modeled on the Incarnation.

